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Abstract
The hacktivist group Anonymous is unusual in its public-
facing nature. Unlike other cybercriminal groups, which rely
on secrecy and privacy for protection, Anonymous is preva-
lent on the social media site, Twitter. In this paper we re-
examine some key findings reported in previous small-scale
qualitative studies of the group using a large-scale compu-
tational analysis of Anonymous’ presence on Twitter. We
specifically refer to reports which reject the group’s claims
of leaderlessness, and indicate a fracturing of the group af-
ter the arrests of prominent members in 2011-2013. In our
research, we present the first attempts to use machine learn-
ing to identify and analyse the presence of a network of over
20,000 Anonymous accounts spanning from 2008-2019 on
the Twitter platform. In turn, this research utilises social net-
work analysis (SNA) and centrality measures to examine the
distribution of influence within this large network, identifying
the presence of a small number of highly influential accounts.
Moreover, we present the first study of tweets from some of
the identified key influencer accounts and, through the use of
topic modelling, demonstrate a similarity in overarching sub-
jects of discussion between these prominent accounts. These
findings provide robust, quantitative evidence to support the
claims of smaller-scale, qualitative studies of the Anonymous
collective.
1 Introduction
The hacker/hacktivist collective Anonymous is a group
whose nebulous and contradictory ethos provide a source
of both bafflement and fascination to those endeavoring to
study them. Originating from the /b/ board of the image
sharing site 4Chan, in which the board’s participants in-
teract anonymously with each other, this sharing of a sin-
gular “Anon” (a member of Anonymous) identity began
to resonate with participants on this site, setting the stage
for growth into the group we know today (Goode 2015).
A group famed for their campaigns (dubbed ‘Ops’) target-
ing many organisations such as The Church of Scientol-
ogy (Goode 2015), the security firm HBGary (Olson 2013),
as well as ISIS, and the governments of the United States
and Australia (Goode 2015).
* Published at the 14th International AAAI Conference on Web
and Social Media (ICWSM 2020). Please cite the ICWSM version.
https://www.aaai.org/ojs/index.php/ICWSM/article/view/7303
Interestingly, there are a significant number of Twitter
accounts claiming some form of affiliation with Anony-
mous. From these accounts’ interactions and posts, one can
begin to establish a sense of how the structure and mes-
sage of Anonymous as a group is presented. Accordingly,
in this research we aim to use the findings of our large-
scale study of Anonymous Twitter accounts to examine the
contentions of smaller-scale, often interview-focused stud-
ies of the group. Such studies reject claims by the group
to its nebulous, leaderless nature (Uitermark 2017; Olson
2013). Furthermore, they suggest that Anonymous fractured
as the result of the arrests of key affiliates (Goode 2015;
Olson 2013); a factor which again refutes the argument of
a decentralised group structure.
To achieve this aim, this paper uses computational meth-
ods – specifically machine learning classifiers, social net-
work analysis (SNA), and topic modelling – to investigate
how the findings of qualitative studies of the group, whose
results are largely derived from interviews and the exami-
nation of secondary sources (i.e., newspaper reports) (Ol-
son 2013; Uitermark 2017), compare to a larger-scale study
of Anonymous’ actual behaviours on Twitter. Specifically,
through our work, this paper:
• Identifies the presence of a sizeable network of Anony-
mous Twitter accounts – containing more than 20,000
Anons – using machine learning methods.
• Uses SNA and centrality measures to map how influence
is distributed across the Anonymous network, confirming
the findings of smaller-scale studies (e.g., (Olson 2013))
that influence is generally the purview of a small number
of members.
• Examines how this network has changed over time rel-
ative to the arrests of key Anons in the 2011-2013 pe-
riod (Uitermark 2017). This longer-term study reveals a
network that is seeing a rise in account inactivity, and a
decrease in new members.
• Compares the overarching tweet content of ‘key’ influ-
encer accounts using topic modelling, finding that each
account’s tweets follow similar lines of content. Again
strengthening the findings of smaller-scale, qualitative
studies.
From this, our research’s large-scale study of Anonymous
on Twitter concludes that, contrary to the group’s claims,
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Anonymous displays a far less organisationally flat structure
than the group aspires to. Such findings have been suggested
by past smaller-scale studies, but as far as we know our work
is the first large-scale study to follow a more systematic and
computational approach.
It is expected that the insights provided into this group
will be of general interest to researchers, cyber security pro-
fessionals, members of the law enforcement community and
the public, by increasing our overall understanding of amor-
phous hacktivist groups, and their use of social media.
2 Background
Uitermark (2017), in his qualitative analysis of Anonymous’
power dynamics, described the group as follows:
Anonymous lacks a central authority, has no founda-
tional ideology, does not represent categorically de-
fined groups, does not consistently endorse ideologies,
and has no fixed objective.
This structure allows for the prevalence of multiple conflict-
ing motivations and ideological goals, with the group ad-
vocating for nihilism and idealism, libertarianism and so-
cialism, pranks (often referred to as ‘lulz’ a corruption of
LOL (laugh out loud), generally used to describe acts that
sought humour at the expense of others) and activism, free-
dom of speech and the suppression of speech (Olson 2013;
Goode 2015). As the group matured over time, these targets
and goals began to be referred to as ‘Ops’ by members of
Anonymous (Olson 2013). The inception of these Ops gen-
erally followed the nebulous structure that the group sub-
scribed to, with the success of an Op directly tying in to its
ability to attract enough Anonymous members to join it (Ol-
son 2013).
Instead of describing Anonymous using group-based the-
ory, Beraldo used the phrase “contentious brand” – a group
defined, and singularly united, by the “Anonymous signi-
fier” (Beraldo 2017). This notion of signification is central
to Anonymous, from the Guy Fawkes mask, to the head-
less businessman, to the grandiose “We are Legion” style of
communication (Beraldo 2017; Olson 2013). And it is the
freely available nature of these methods of identification that
allow for this movement to be so amorphous. As highlighted
by Nurse and Bada (2018), the Anonymous Twitter account
@GroupAnon stated: “No, this is not the official #Anony-
mous account. There is no official account. We have no cen-
tral leadership. (Other than the FBI/NSA, joke)”. And the
central reason there can be no official Anonymous account
is that its membership is entirely reliant on the utilisation
of the Anonymous brand, something freely available to all,
rather than something that can be formally accessed by se-
curing an approved membership.
A point of interest however is that Anonymous’ posi-
tion of having no central-authority has often been contra-
dicted in practice. Although both Olson and Uitermark noted
Anonymous’ claims to a flat leadership structure, they both
suggested that Anonymous’ reality – at least on IRC (in-
ternet relay chat) – was far less a flat structure than one
with a clear set of leaders (Olson 2013; Uitermark 2017).
Uitermark and Olson described the existence of a ‘#Com-
mand’ room on IRC, in which these self appointed leaders
– without the knowledge of other Anons – would plan the
group’s Ops. Moreover, a considerable change was noted in
the group after the arrest of several members of the #Com-
mand board (also members of the Anonymous splinter group
LulzSec (Olson 2013)) in 2012. After this, Uitermark (2017)
concluded that the group had fragmented considerably, stat-
ing that:
Anonymous lived on ... as a set of symbols and com-
munication channels ... appropriated by a range of dif-
ferent groups for a range of different purposes.
In turn, the group seemed to have lost the coherence present
in its early days, leading to a drastic fall in notable operations
and exploits (Goode 2015).
An additional key point of Anonymous, as elucidated by
Nurse and Bada (2018), is that it is a group that has a strong
“public-facing nature”. Their work noted the presence of
several Twitter profiles controlled by Anonymous affiliates,
and the group further confirmed this via its willingness to
engage with journalists; be it through IRC or even via in-
terviews (Olson 2013). By being public facing, Anonymous
can easily capture more media attention, and bring new re-
cruits to whichever Op the group, or a splinter of the group,
is executing.
3 Related Work
Due to the strong influence that high reputation players can
wield on a particular network, it is of interest to be able
to identify who these key players are. In (Nouh and Nurse
2015), the authors identified a social network of activists
operating on Facebook, and then deployed a variety of tech-
niques to identify the key players within this network. This
research utilised centrality measures such as betweenness
and eigenvector centrality to assess the influence of activists
within the group. These metrics give a sense of how inter-
connected the network is, its durability, and which of the
nodes in the network wield the most influence. From this, a
disparity between the activity of a user and their influence on
the network was identified, as well as the presence of sub-
communities with stronger ties within the wider network. In
doing so, this work lays out a strong method for gaining a
good analytical understanding of influence within a given
social network.
Social network graphs, combined with PageRank central-
ity measures, have also been utilised by Alfifi et al. (2019)
in their study of ISIS on Twitter. This was done via the con-
struction of a network graph representing the connections
between ISIS accounts via their retweets, and subsequently
utilised PageRank to estimate the overall influence that ISIS
held on Twitter. This was then compared to a randomly sam-
pled group to investigate whether ISIS holds, or is able to
exert, more influence over the Twitter community than the
average Twitter group (Alfifi et al. 2019).
These forms of network analysis have also been applied
to the study of Anonymous on Twitter, and the manner
in which a network, derived from the use of “#Anony-
mous”, evolved over the period from 1 December 2012 to 30
November 2015 (Beraldo 2017). In turn, the work examined
the stability of this Anonymous network, finding that stabil-
ity in general appeared low, with the number of nodes recur-
ring in the following month falling by 47.8%, and the per-
centage of connections between nodes surviving the month
being, on average, 12.6% (Beraldo 2017).
Moreover, an additional study of Anonymous on Twitter
utilised this same method of identifying Anonymous affili-
ates by their use of “#Anonymous” to examine differences
between male and female account holders, and the types
of ‘Ops’ they tweeted about (McGovern and Fortin 2020).
From this, it was found that male Anons generally tweeted
about a multitude of different ‘Ops’ – including those fo-
cused on animal rights activism, and the identification of
sexual predators – whilst female Anons focused almost en-
tirely on ‘Ops’ concerning animal rights (McGovern and
Fortin 2020).
Topic modelling is a technique that seeks to extract clus-
ters of words within a document that are semantically simi-
lar, in turn dividing the document into the word groupings or
‘topics’ that it is comprised of. This technique has seen use
within the field of cybercriminal study including (Tavabi et
al. 2019; Kigerl 2018) amongst others. Tavabi et al. (2019)
used latent Dirichlet allocation (LDA) – a form of topic
modelling that allows words to occur in multiple topics –
to help understand the core content of activity across 80
dark web forums. This included a number of topics related
to vending, security and gaming.
Moreover, Kigerl (2018) applied a similar technique to
dark-web carding forums (dark-web services centred around
the sale of stolen bank cards); identifying the key topics
present within the comment histories of users, including
keywords pertaining to products sold, and customer satis-
faction. This technique therefore helps provide a summative
view of a large amount of textual information, allowing for
large-scale studies of cybercriminal groups on online plat-
forms.
4 Our Contributions
Anonymous is unusual in its desire for the spotlight, and
the manner in which it relies on social media (e.g., Twitter
and YouTube) to profess its messages. Therefore, this pa-
per aims to examine the results of the small-scale, generally
interview-based and anecdotal studies of the group seen in
Section 2, using a study of a large network of Anonymous
affiliated accounts on Twitter. To our knowledge this form
of large scale analysis of Anonymous Twitter accounts has
not been performed before. Moreover, this article focuses on
the more permanent Anonymous affiliated accounts, and in
particular, how influence is distributed across the network
and how the network has changed over time – especially in
response to the 2011-2013 arrests (Olson 2013).
Our research moves beyond previous studies of Anony-
mous on Twitter which relied on the more narrow use
of “#Anonymous” (Beraldo 2017; McGovern and Fortin
2020) to identify Anonymous affiliates. Albeit arguable,
such methods of characterisation seem to ignore the wide
range of purposes for which any account may use a partic-
ular hashtag. Moreover, this work expands upon the studies
of Anonymous’ content, by being the first to conduct a sys-
tematic study of Anonymous tweets. This therefore moves
beyond the methodology of McGovern and Fortin (2020)
which focused purely on frequencies of ‘Op’ related hash-
tag usage. Our paper also addresses the lack of studies
focused on the group after the arrests between 2011 and
2013 and its alleged fall from the limelight (Goode 2015;
Olson 2013). These analyses provide unique empirical in-
sights into one of the most well-known hacker/hacktivists
groups that has ever existed.
5 Methodology
In order to meet this study’s aims, machine learning was
used to construct a network graph detailing the connections
between a previously unidentified large sampling of Anony-
mous accounts. This network was then used to examine
the manner in which influence presented itself, and whether
there were any identifiable key Anonymous influencers. In
turn, the latest tweets of selected influencer accounts were
collected and LDA topic modelling conducted. The topics
identified were then analysed to gain a sense of the co-
hesiveness in subject matter across influencer accounts, as
well as to identify any similarities between these topics and
Anonymous’ interests before the aforementioned 2011-2013
arrests. We detail our approach below.
5.1 Data Collection
To generate the dataset, two-staged snowball sampling was
used to recursively iterate through five Anonymous seed ac-
counts. We collected the Anonymous followers and friends
of these five accounts, and thereafter the Anonymous follow-
ers and friends of each seed accounts’ followers and friends.
This technique was chosen for its effectiveness at sampling
hidden populations on Twitter (Benigni, Joseph, and Car-
ley 2017). The five accounts selected as seeds were cho-
sen as they had been identified by Nurse and Bada (2018)
as being notably linked to the Anonymous collective. The
account @YourAnonGlobal, the sixth Anonymous account
mentioned in Nurse et al.’s paper, was not included in the
study as the account is currently suspended.
All friend and follower extractions were made using Twit-
ter’s Standard search API. Twitter restricts the sharing of
Twitter content (in this case, account names) should the ex-
tracted content subsequently be suspended, deleted, or made
private. Therefore, this paper has opted to pseudonymise ref-
erences to specific accounts to ensure this paper remains
compliant with Twitter’s terms and conditions should any
of these events happen to the pseudonymised accounts ref-
erenced in this paper (Twitter 2020a). It is worth clarifying
that any account that had been deleted, suspended, or made
protected prior to when the sampling was conducted will not
have been included in the study as Twitter does not make
these accounts available to those using their search API.
As the totalled follower and friend numbers for the five
seed accounts was approximately 2 million (as of 1 Decem-
ber 2019), it was necessary to automate the identification of
Anonymous accounts. Moreover, due to the nebulous nature
of the group, a rigorous definition by which to manually la-
bel these accounts as Anonymous affiliated does not exist.
It was therefore decided that a rudimentary definition would
be used to manually label a number of Anonymous accounts,
before leveraging a machine learning model trained on these
labelled accounts to identify Anonymous accounts amongst
the followers and friends.
anonymous an0nym0u5 anonymou5 an0nymous
anonym0us anonym0u5 an0nymou5 an0nym0us
anony an0ny anon an0n
legion l3gion legi0n le3gi0n
leg1on l3g1on leg10n l3g10n
Table 1: Anonymous keywords used.
To provide the training set for the model, we decided that
a ‘positive’ Anonymous account would be defined as one
that contained at least one Anonymous-related keyword (see
Table 1) in either its username or screen-name, and in its de-
scription, as well as having a profile or background (cover)
image containing either a Guy Fawkes mask or a floating
businessman (both common Anon images (Olson 2013)).
This definition, whilst likely overzealous in its specificity,
allowed for a set of Anonymous accounts that are relatively,
given the topic, uncontroversial in their labelling. The key-
words were derived from the Anonymous literature (Olson
2013; Goode 2015), and a manual examination of the five
Anonymous seed accounts.
The labelling process of the five seed accounts’ follow-
ers and friends was then carried out using a combination
of automated and manual techniques. Firstly, each of the
followers and friends were automatically filtered based on
the presence of Anonymous keywords (Table 1) in either
the username or screen-name of each account. After the
filtering process approximately 38,000 accounts remained.
These were then hand labelled by the authors of the pa-
per, via a manual examination of each account’s Twitter
page, in accordance with the prescribed definition. This in
turn identified 9,337 Anonymous accounts, and 29,351 non-
Anonymous accounts.
These two sets of hand-labelled accounts were then used
to train a machine learning model to automatically identify
Anonymous accounts. SVM (with a sigmoid kernel), deci-
sion trees, and random forest (with 100 trees) were tested to
identify the best performer. All testing was conducted using
five-fold cross validation. For this research, the Scikit-learn
implementations of these algorithms were used (Pedregosa
et al. 2011).
In total, 62 features were extracted from each account, in-
cluding features directly related to Anonymous and hacker
culture, as well as features noting the profile and con-
tent information of each account. Moreover, two metrics:
Flesch-Kincaid reading-age score (Aslan, Sag˘lam, and Li
2018), and VADER compound sentiment analysis (Hutto
and Gilbert 2014) were also calculated from each account’s
description and the results used as additional features. A
full list of the features can be found in Table 2. For clar-
ity, the Anonymous motto – referenced in Table 2 – is de-
tailed in (Olson 2013). Where appropriate, the features in
the list were collected for the username, screen-name, and
description of each account (so for number of characters,
three separate features are recorded). It is worth emphasis-
ing that these features were derived only from the account
information; no tweets were leveraged in the creation of this
classifier. Whilst this likely inhibited the effectiveness of the
model, it also allowed us to test the ability of models to clas-
sify accounts despite having a limited amount of informa-
tion to draw upon. This was a crucial test given the tighter
restrictions Twitter has recently enacted in terms of tweet
collection using its search APIs.
Having extracted features for the positive and negative
sets of accounts, each of the three models were tested using
5-fold cross validation to identify the most effective algo-
rithm. Of the three, random forest offered the highest scores
both for the overall accuracy, and for precision and recall
with a score of 0.94 for each of these metrics (see Table 3
for a full comparison of performances). It was thus selected
as the algorithm of choice.
Having established its effectiveness, the random forest
model was trained on the entirety of the manually-labelled
dataset and was then used on the entire seed follower and
friend list to identify the presence of any Anonymous ac-
counts that had been discounted using the crude name fil-
tering during the labelling process. The model identified
15,222 Anonymous accounts in total – including the ap-
proximate 8,846 accounts that had been manually labelled
and in turn identified by the model in the training phase.
The process was then repeated on the follower and friends
of these identified Anonymous accounts, yielding a total
of 20,506 identified Anonymous accounts across the two-
stages of sampling.
5.2 Building the Anonymous Network and
Identifying Influencers
Social network analysis (SNA) is an analytical technique
that investigates “social structures by utilising graph the-
ory concepts” (Nouh and Nurse 2015). This mapping of
connections between actors then allows for the use of net-
work centrality measures to identify the nodes which ex-
ert the most influence over the network (Alfifi et al. 2019;
Beraldo 2017).
Four of the most common metrics for identifying in-
fluencer nodes are degree centrality, eigenvector central-
ity, its variant PageRank, and betweenness centrality (Bor-
gatti 2005; Nouh and Nurse 2015). These metrics have
seen use in the analysis of social media groups; including
both Anonymous and Occupy Wall Street on Twitter, and
other activists on Facebook (Borgatti 2005; Tremayne 2014;
Nouh and Nurse 2015), and allow for the identification of
‘key’ influencer nodes in a given network.
In our work, SNA is used to map the relationships be-
tween identified Anonymous accounts and centrality mea-
sures used to identify the key influencer accounts in the
network. We defined a non-weighted directed graph G =
(V,E) where each node u ∈ V represents an Anonymous
Twitter account, and each edge (p, q) ∈ E a follower re-
lationship, where Anonymous account p is a follower of
Anonymous account q . In order to obtain the most accurate
Anonymous Features Profile Features Content Features
‘Anonymous’ used Tweet number Number of characters
‘Anon’ used Follower number Number of words
‘Anony’ used Friend Number URL in description
‘Legion’ used Follower-Friend ratio Number of uppercase characters
‘Ops’ used Favorites Number Number of lowercase characters
Anon motto in description Number of Lists Number of alphabetical characters
‘Hacker’ terms used Location Provided Number of numerical characters
L33t speak used Is account protected Number of punctuation characters
Capitalisation within words Is URL provided Number of emoji used
Number of mentions
Number of hashtags
Flesch-Kincaid score
VADER score
Table 2: List of features.
Model Precision Recall F1-Score
Random forest 0.94 0.94 0.94
Decision tree 0.90 0.90 0.90
SVM (sigmoid kernel) 0.66 0.74 0.67
Table 3: Performances of the three tested machine learning
models.
sense of which accounts are most influential; degree central-
ity, eigenvector centrality, PageRank, and betweenness cen-
trality scores were recorded for each account in the network.
The construction of the SNA graph and the centrality cal-
culations were conducted using the NetworkX Python pack-
age (Hagberg, Schult, and Swart 2008).
After calculating the scores for each account in these se-
lected centrality measures, the resulting scores were nor-
malised, and each account’s average score across the four
measures was recorded. As each metric measures influence
in a slightly different way, this method attempts to ensure
that the accounts that are the most broadly influential are
ranked the highest.
5.3 Extracting Topics From Key Anonymous
Tweets
Latent Dirichlect allocation (LDA) is among the most popu-
lar forms of topic modelling (Tavabi et al. 2019), and is the
method used in this paper. LDA works under the assump-
tion that each given document is comprised of a random
mixture of latent topics, with each topic being made up of
a particular distribution of words (Tavabi et al. 2019). LDA
allows for terms to be members of more than one topic, and
the the assignment is probabilistic, with the probabilities of
each term across topics summing to 1.0 (Kigerl 2018). LDA
works over a set number of iterations, improving and updat-
ing the probabilities upon previous iterations of the model
until significant improvement is deemed to have halted. The
Gensim Python implementation of LDA was used for this
research (Rˇehu˚rˇek and Sojka 2010).
The model itself provides one estimate – the distribu-
tion of words over topics, derived from another, user spec-
ified, estimate – the number of topics present in the docu-
ment (Kigerl 2018). As the number of topics with which the
LDA model attempts to distribute over are user-specified, it
was necessary to run the model continuously over a variety
of topic numbers to identity the most suitable topic num-
ber per Anonymous account. In order to assess the quality
of each topic number, the UCI topic coherence was used as
a metric to assess the quality of the learned topics for each
given topic-number (Ro¨der, Both, and Hinneburg 2015).
As this research sought to carry out topic modelling on the
tweets of the most influential Anonymous accounts, the top
6 scoring accounts averaged across the aforementioned cen-
trality measures were selected to be the accounts of interest.
The top influencer accounts were selected for further anal-
ysis as they are the accounts in the best position to spread
their messages, via tweeting, to the whole Anonymous net-
work. Thereby making their messages the most pervasive in
the network.
In turn, the most recent 1,500 tweets of the top 6 accounts
were collected using Twitter’s Premium search API (Twitter
2020b) from 1 July 2019 to 29 December 2019. Each ac-
count’s most recent tweets were collected as this study aims
to assess the activities and behaviours of these accounts as
of their latest interactions on Twitter. Moreover, as the in-
fluencer accounts are identified from their current relations
with other accounts, it seemed sensible to examine their
most current tweets, rather than tweets from a particular time
period. In order to comply with Twitter’s developer guide-
lines the selected accounts will be referred to as accounts A
to F; with Account A representing the most influential ac-
count, Account B the second, and so on.
After collection, the tweets for each influencer account
were pre-processed; including the removal of stop words,
expansion of contractions, and the removal of Twitter spe-
cific noise like the use of ‘RT’ for retweets. UCI was then
used to score topic models with topic numbers starting at 2,
and progressing in steps of 6 to a maximum of 40 topics.
All coherence scores were again computed using the Python
Figure 1: Trimmed network of the top 100 Anonymous ac-
counts ranked by eigenvector centrality score. The darkness
of node color corresponds to eigenvector score, the node size
corresponds to degree centrality score. Note the presence of
key nodes that significantly outscore their peers, especially
given the reduced network size.
Gensim package (Rˇehu˚rˇek and Sojka 2010).
Upon completion of these calculations, and with reference
to their coherence scores, topic numbers 15, 15, 10, 12, 20
and 25 were selected with each topic number linked to each
influencer account in descending order of influence respec-
tively (e.g., 15 topics were used for Account A, 15 for Ac-
count B, etc.). LDA topic modelling was then carried out on
these accounts using the pre-selected topic numbers and the
top scoring words for each account identified topic, for each
account, were recorded.
6 Results and Discussion
In this section, the Anonymous network, and the way in
which influence presents itself will be examined and the re-
sults of the topic modelling of influencer account tweets will
be reviewed and explored in relation to the smaller, qualita-
tive studies of the group. This study will allow us to synthe-
sise the findings of smaller-scale, interview-based studies of
Anonymous with our findings of the group on a larger scale.
We achieved our aims by using SNA and centrality measures
to examine how the network presents itself in light of the
qualitative studies’ claims that the group failed to meet its
unifying goal of a leaderless, flat structure (Uitermark 2017;
Olson 2013). Furthermore, we consider their further claims
that Anonymous has suffered a serious fragmentation and
a fall into relative inactivity after the arrest of key mem-
bers in the period 2011-2013 (Goode 2015; Olson 2013).
Topic modelling of influencer account tweets is then used to
further examine whether the claims by previous qualitative
studies that the group is not as ideologically diverse as it ap-
pears, manifests itself in the original content of Anonymous
affiliates (Olson 2013; Uitermark 2017).
6.1 Examining Influence in the Anonymous
Social Network
After the two-staged snowball sampling, 20,506 Anony-
mous accounts, their relevant meta-data (including total
number of tweets, number of followers, number of friends,
etc.), and their relationships to each other had been identi-
fied and collected. This allowed for the creation of a size-
able network graph with 349,445 edges, and in turn not just
the identification of influencer accounts, but also an exami-
nation of how influence relates to other factors.
In relation to this paper’s aim of examining qualitative
literature’s findings that reject Anonymous’ depiction of
having no central authority (Olson 2013; Uitermark 2017),
this section looks at how influence is distributed across the
Anonymous network. This analysis allows us to determine
whether a small number of prominent influencers has indeed
arisen. These centrality scores are then compared to the cre-
ation date of each account to gain a sense of how the network
has changed over time, and how influence relates to when an
account was created. Moreover, the manner in which the net-
work has evolved over time will be investigated against the
findings of smaller-scale, qualitative literature that the group
suffered fragmentation after the arrests of prominent mem-
bers.
Examining the Distribution of Influence After the four
centrality measures were carried out on this 20,506 strong
network, the top scoring accounts from each measure were
recorded, as were the top scoring accounts averaged across
the four measures. The first area of interest regarding in-
fluence was to investigate whether there were a small num-
ber of Anonymous accounts scoring highly in influence, or
whether influence was more evenly distributed. Across the
four metrics, the results were found to be largely similar with
a small number of accounts scoring highly for each partic-
ular centrality measure, and the rest of the accounts scor-
ing comparatively lowly. A visual depiction of the top 100
scorers for eigenvector and degree centrality can be found
in Fig. 1. Moreover, results depicting the top 1,000 accounts
for each measure, and their subsequent centrality scores, are
defined in Fig. 2.
This result is interesting as it appears to reject the claims
by the group that they lack any clear hierarchy or set of
central figures. Instead, within the Anonymous Twitter net-
work we see a similar balance in terms of influence as the
claims made by smaller studies. Ultimately, it appears that
the vast majority of influence is actually held by a small
number of accounts, whilst the vast majority of Anonymous
accounts wield no real influence at all (Olson 2013). This
helps confirm that the notion of a lack of clear structure
may be largely theoretical, or perhaps aspirational, within
the Anonymous network. Ultimately, an ideal that has not
materialised within this newly identified, large network of
accounts.
The Anonymous Network over Time To help gain a bet-
ter understanding of influence within the network, the ac-
count creation dates and the last tweet dates were examined
for the 20,506 accounts in the network. From this we found
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Figure 2: Graphs showing the scores of the 1000 highest scoring accounts in each centrality measure.
that Anonymous accounts displaying the highest centrality
scores were generally created between or before 2011-2013
(when the arrests took place), with 62.5% of the top 500
accounts, and 91.5% of the top 50 accounts on average hav-
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Figure 3: Number of Anonymous accounts created each
year.
ing been created in this period. Given the large disparity be-
tween the top scoring influencer accounts and the rest of the
Anonymous accounts in the network, this indicates that the
majority of influencer accounts originated during or before
the time of the arrests of the key Anonymous figures.
There are two things to note, one data-driven and the other
contextual, that may help expand upon this finding. Firstly,
the accounts present in the Anonymous network were gen-
erally created in the years in which the influencer accounts
were created (see Fig. 3). Going backwards in years this
is understandable; Anonymous’ first real action, “Opera-
tion Chanology”, was carried out in 2008 (Olson 2013).
At that time, Twitter was a relatively underused platform,
with a mere 6 million users compared to the 117 million it
achieved by 2011 (Wolfe 2018). This increase in users per
year matches Anonymous’ increased presence on Twitter
until peaking around the years 2012 and 2013, when Anony-
mous account creation slowly appears to drop whilst Twit-
ter’s user numbers continued to climb (Wolfe 2018).
This continued drop in Anonymous accounts despite the
increased popularity of the Twitter platform marries well
with the results of the smaller-scale, qualitative studies of the
group. These studies’ suggestions of a group fragmentation
after the 2011-2013 arrests pairs well with the fall in Anony-
mous accounts being created on Twitter from around the
same period of time (Goode 2015; Olson 2013). Moreover,
although the popularity of Anonymous on Twitter seems to
have ebbed in time with the apparent fragmenting of the
group after the arrests, accounts created in Anonymous’ pe-
riod of prominence are still the ones most likely to exert
influence. This suggests a more rigid structure of influence
than Anonymous has claimed (Uitermark 2017).
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Figure 4: Number of Anonymous accounts that stopped
tweeting each year.
What is worth noting in regards to this more tangible pic-
ture moreover, is that of the members of this Anonymous
network, only around 50% have tweeted since 2015, and
35% since 2016 (Fig. 4). This shows that not only has the
number of accounts created each year dropped significantly,
but also that the majority of accounts have fallen inactive
since the arrests. In fact, we can see from Fig. 4 that only
9% of accounts have tweeted in the year 2019, and that since
2012 there has been a steady number of accounts tweeting
their last tweet. Ultimately, although this network seems to
present with a central group of influencers from the pre-
arrest period of Anonymous’ history, the number of accounts
that appeared to be active is but a small fraction of the com-
plete network. The fact that this fall in activity roughly oc-
curs in time with the arrests in 2011-2013 further indicates
that the group suffered a severe fragmentation as a result.
6.2 Extracting Topics From Anonymous Tweets
Having extracted the 1,500 latest tweets from the top six
scoring Anonymous influencer accounts (four of the top
six accounts were accounts previously used as seeds in
the account collection phase), topic modelling was carried
out to determine the overarching areas of focus present
within each account’s corpus of tweets. In turn, this al-
lowed us a previously unexamined look into the content
of these Anonymous accounts and their overarching topics
of focus. This was done in order to examine the cohesive-
ness and consistency in subject-matter across influencer ac-
counts relative to claims that reject Anonymous’ position
of having no consistent areas of interest (Uitermark 2017;
Olson 2013).
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Figure 5: Time series graph showing each influencer ac-
count, and the years in which their 1,500 most recent tweets
were tweeted.
Before continuing further into the results of the topic
modelling, it is first worth noting that due to the differing
tweeting habits of each of these six accounts, the period of
time captured within each batch of 1,500 tweets varies be-
tween accounts (see Fig. 5). It also worth restating the num-
ber of topics with which each account’s corpus of tweets was
divided. Account A used 15 topics, Account B: 15, Account
C: 10, Account D: 12, and Account E: 20, and Account F:
25.
After topic modelling was carried out, each topic was la-
belled in accordance with the top ten words belonging to
that topic, and the likely theme, person, event, etc. it repre-
sented. An example of this can be seen in Table 4, showing
the topics and key words found from Account A’s tweets.
Topic Modelling Results For Account A, the majority of
topics are focused on politics in some fashion, generally cen-
tred on the politics of the USA and the UK. This includes
general topics about American politics, Brexit, and Donald
Trump. There is also one topic concerned with the recent EU
Copyright Directive, whose Articles 11 and 13 have brought
recent controversy regarding the requirement for online plat-
forms “to filter or remove copyrighted material from their
websites” (Reynolds 2019). Account A was also the only
account to contain topics that included within its key words
the Twitter names of known associates of Anonymous (these
names have been anonymised).
Account B’s topics also contained topics focused both
generally, and specifically on US politics, alongside top-
ics focused on net neutrality. Although we cannot say for
certain given the nature of this analytical method, bearing
the account’s time span in terms of collected tweets (2017-
2019) in mind, this likely is in reference to the repeal of
net neutrality that occurred in 2018. Indeed, the appearance
of ‘FCC’ as a keyword for one of the net neutrality top-
ics strengthens this assumption. The FCC (Federal Com-
Topics Key Words
Conflict in Iraq people, asylum, concern, iraq, issue, turn, hate, learn, internet, question
Donald Trump and Conflict trump, war, crime, free, people, war crime, time, election, feel, platform
Democrats and US Politics democrat, post, expect, voter, exit, profit, server, goal, poll, send
Republicans and US Politics problem, person, republican, american, identity, challenge, obama, understand,
steal, order
US Politics administration, prosecute, america, ago, pass, woman, article, long, good, bush
Brexit expose, ireland, border, country, good, remain, life, journalist, return, password
Journalistic Freedom freedom, press, press freedom, people, chelseamanning, thing, bit, claim, fascist,
white
EU Copyright Directive vote, eucopyrightdirective, european, medium, democracy, response, war,
uploadfilters, happen, article13
Wikileaks and Assange’s Arrest arrest, ecuador, people, human, wikileaks, wrong, publish, time, block, hold
Wikileaks and Edward Snow-
den
assange, torture, government, charge, wikileaks, read, whistleblower, julian,
snowden, julian assange
Anonymous and Anon Mem-
bers
[Redacted], contributor, [Redacted], [Redacted], account, content, fail,
[Redacted], [Redacted]
Twitter account, twitter, live, publish, require, day, long, user, forget, simple
Unclear brexit, people, fact, manning, year, file, power, pay, party, work
Unclear history, work, mind, privacy, laugh, flee, data, document, politics, lose
Unclear tweet, leak, link, access, state, change, expose, political, bad, anti
Table 4: Account A’s Topics. Certain keywords have been redacted as they identified active Twitter accounts.
munications Commission) were responsible for voting for
the repealing of net neutrality policies in December 2017 –
a period of time covered by the tweets collected from this
account (Mack 2019). There were also two separate topics
likely focused on significant data breaches affecting Face-
book and Equifax (Cadwalladr and Graham-Harrison 2018;
BBC News 2019).
Account C’s topics contained references to US politics,
in particular the 2016 general election (this account’s tweets
cover that time span). However, the majority of topics are
focused either on Wikileaks, leak culture in general, or polit-
ical action. Of interest is the presence of three separate iden-
tified topics which seem focused on Wikileaks and Turkey;
presumably – given the appearance of the words ‘coup’ and
‘erdogan’ – the publishing by Wikileaks of the ‘Erdogan
Emails’ directly after the failed coup in 2016 (Greenberg
2016). Also of note is the presence of the topic concerning
‘Op Icarus’, the only Op related topic identified within these
accounts’ tweets. Op Icarus was an action carried out by
Anonymous, and involved the use of DDoS attacks against
eight international banks’ websites in May 2016 (Ashok
2016).
Account D’s topics presented in a similar way, with the
majority focused on US politics – Donald Trump in par-
ticular – as well as topics indicating discussion of politi-
cal change; and wider topics focused on leaks, data security,
backdoors and encryption. Of note is a topic focused around
Edward Snowden – the former NSA analyst responsible for
leaking top-secret NSA documents to The Guardian news-
paper – and the words ‘paypal’ and ‘donation’. Again, one
has to be careful in making inferences from this very high
level view of tweets containing each topic, but it is of note
that ‘Edward Snowden’s website actively seeks donations to
‘Help cover the defence costs of the whistle-blower who re-
vealed the NSA mass surveillance programs’, and that these
donations can be sent through Paypal (Courage 2020).
Account E’s topics also share a political focus, and as
well as discussions based around activism, protest, and the
Occupy movement. Specifically, the emphasis falls on po-
lice brutality, as well as protests against Acta, an intellectual
property rights agreement that some feared would lead to
censorship on the web (Solon 2012). In line with the other
accounts, there was also topics focused on leaking; including
discussion of Julian Assange and Wikileaks. This includes
reference to geopolitical intelligence company Stratfor, and
presumably the leaking of their emails to Wikileaks (Javers
2012).
Finally, Account F once again shares great similarities
with the other accounts. Topics from this account include
a focus on politics in general, as well as specifically on
Brexit, Donald Trump, and Turkey – particularly the 2016
coup. Topics referencing leaking also appear, with reference
to Wikileaks and Edward Snowden.
As a whole, we can see a number of consistencies ap-
pearing across each of the Anonymous influencer accounts.
It appears that all of the accounts share a focus on politi-
cal matters, especially those of the USA, with a keen focus
on President Trump. Moreover, issues concerning data are
also shared by all of the accounts, and issues concerning the
leaking of data appear in all but one (Account B). In turn, we
also have to remember that due to the differing time frames,
the lack of a particular topic from one account to the next
does not necessitate that that topic was not discussed. Issues
such as net neutrality are largely focused around the years
2017 and 2018 (Mack 2019), meaning that although it only
appeared in one of the account’s models, other accounts, like
Account A, may have still discussed it. It is just that the time
frame for their latest 1,500 tweets (the year 2019 for Ac-
count A), rendered this topic less likely to occur.
Therefore, reflecting on the cohesiveness in influencer ac-
count content, we certainly see within these topics Anony-
mous influencers largely centred on similar subject matter
both to each other, and to the ‘active’ Anonymous of the
early 2010s (Olson 2013; Uitermark 2017). Although in the-
ory Anonymous claims to be a platform to be used by any,
for anything; for one reason or another this does not seem
to be the case on Twitter, at least for these accounts of in-
fluence. The vast majority of topics identified are largely
in line with the forms of action the group (particularly the
‘moralfag’ arm of the group) was taking during its more no-
torious periods in the early 2010s, and are largely in line with
each other (Olson 2013). Their focus is largely extended to
politics, political action, the freedom of information, leaks,
cyber-security, and very little else. Issues that seem to fit
nicely with the content one would expect from Anonymous
affiliates during the prime years of the group (Olson 2013;
Uitermark 2017).
Moreover, as some of these collections of tweets are
spread throughout several years, we are offered a more long-
term sense of these accounts’ activity. From this, it seems
that accounts tweeting over a long period of time are tweet-
ing about roughly the same subject matter as those tweet-
ing over a shorter period. This finding indicates that these
consistencies present in both the long-term tweeting habits
of these influencer accounts, as well as the short – further
contradicting the claims of the group to its ephemeral na-
ture (Uitermark 2017).
Furthermore, a feature that was surprisingly absent, but
which unified the topics of these accounts, is the lack of
‘lulz’ topics – one of the key ideological rifts noted in the
group’s more notorious period before the 2011-2013 ar-
rests (Uitermark 2017). This lack indicates a unity between
these accounts and potentially the network as a whole, as
well as a notable absence of this facet of Anonymous. Whilst
the ‘lulz’ may live on in other networks, or other parts of
this network, it is worth highlighting that the key influencer
accounts are united towards topics of a more high-minded
value. This therefore indicates a distancing, in this particu-
lar network, from the more nihilistic aspects often associated
with the group.
Also surprising is the apparent lack of Op related content.
Although some of these topics may have some form of Op
attached to them, only one topic – Op Icarus from Account
C – has an Op present in its keywords. It is possible that
the lack of Op mentions mirrors the suggested inactivity and
fragmentation of Anonymous post-arrests.
6.3 Limitations
There are a few limitations with regards to the data used that
need to be acknowledged. In terms of the Anonymous net-
work, it may be worth expanding upon a two-staged snow-
ball sample to examine the full extent of the network. More
work could thus be done to expand upon this work to iden-
tify the network in its entirety, or indeed to identify the pres-
ence of other Anonymous networks that may exist separately
from the one found in this paper. Moreover, due to certain
accounts (e.g., those suspended, deleted or protected) being
made unavailable, we would like to acknowledge that whilst
our study examines a large number of Anonymous accounts,
it does not necessarily offer a complete picture of the net-
work in its entirety. This is, however, more a reflection of
the limitations of Twitter’s Standard search API, rather than
the project itself.
In regards to the topic modelling, a larger scale project
over a greater period of time would allow for a higher num-
ber of tweets collected per account, as well as a higher num-
ber of influencer accounts included in the topic modelling.
This would help improve our understanding of the similari-
ties and differences in content between influencer accounts,
and strengthen the conclusions made by this paper.
7 Conclusions
Overall, our large-scale study of the Anonymous network on
Twitter has worked to provide a synthesis with the findings
of smaller qualitative studies of the Anonymous collective.
In turn providing their findings, largely derived from inter-
views, with evidence from the large scale behaviour of self-
identified Anonymous affiliates.
In our studies of influence, we have found that whilst
Anonymous makes claims to a flat structure, this may not
be the case. Just as the smaller-scale studies suggested,
the reality for this large Anonymous network is that influ-
ence appears to be the privilege of a very small number
of accounts. Accounts created during Anonymous’ period
of more frequent operation before the arrests of their ‘key’
members (Uitermark 2017; Olson 2013). Moreover, we see
that the number of Anonymous accounts being created each
year has decreased significantly, and the number of accounts
falling silently each year is significant too.
Furthermore given that the key influencers on the Anony-
mous network are accounts created during the group’s more
prominent period, it is not necessarily surprising that the
content we see from them is very much in line with what the
group was concerned with during the early 2010s – partic-
ularly focusing on political action and the sharing of infor-
mation. In addition, the surprising lack of Op based tweets
potentially supports the fragmentation and fall to inactiv-
ity suggested by qualitative studies of the group (Uitermark
2017; Olson 2013; Goode 2015).
7.1 Future Work
In future, work could be done to expand the scope of the
research beyond six influencer accounts to look at the con-
tent of the Anonymous network as something more akin to a
whole. This would help us understand whether the similar-
ity in content of the influencer accounts is something that ap-
pears across the network in its entirety. Moreover, additional
metrics of influence may be useful to verify the conclusions
drawn from the centrality measures. Finally, a larger study of
Anonymous account topics over a longer period could help
to verify whether the lack of Op based content indicates a
fall in the group’s activity, or perhaps that the Anonymous
Twitter network has never involved itself in this aspect of the
group.
Further work could also be carried out to compare the
findings of this paper with the behaviours of Anonymous
on other social media platforms, such as Facebook and
YouTube, as well as with their more private dealings on
IRC. These studies could help us gain a broader sense of
the group’s behaviours, and whether the findings of this pa-
per are purely a description of Anonymous on Twitter, or
whether they are also emergent in the group’s general be-
haviours on other platforms.
Finally, the methods detailed here – combining machine
learning for identification of affiliates, with SNA and topic
modelling to examine behaviour – could also be repurposed
towards the study of other groups online. Due to the relative
simplicity and intuitive nature of the methods, these could
even be of potential use to law enforcement and the cyber
threat intelligence community who are interested in gaining
a broader understanding of criminal organisations online.
References
[Alfifi et al. 2019] Alfifi, M.; Kaghazgaran, P.; Caverlee, J.;
and Morstatter, F. 2019. A large-scale study of ISIS social
media strategy: Community size, collective influence, and
behavioral impact. Proceedings of the 2019 International
AAAI Conference on Web and Social Media (ICWSM ’19)
13:58–67.
[Ashok 2016] Ashok, I. 2016. Op Icarus: Anony-
mous launches DDoS attacks on international
banks. International Business Times. Available at
https://www.ibtimes.co.uk/op-icarus-anonymous-launches-
ddos-attacks-8-international-banks-1558987.
[Aslan, Sag˘lam, and Li 2018] Aslan, c. B.; Sag˘lam, R. B.;
and Li, S. 2018. Automatic detection of cyber security re-
lated accounts on online social networks: Twitter as an ex-
ample. In Proceedings of 9th International Conference on
Social Media and Society (SMSociety ’18), 236–240.
[BBC News 2019] BBC News. 2019. Equifax to pay up to
$700m to settle data breach. BBC News. Available at https:
//www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-49070596.
[Benigni, Joseph, and Carley 2017] Benigni, M. C.; Joseph,
K.; and Carley, K. M. 2017. Online extremism and the
communities that sustain it: Detecting the ISIS supporting
community on Twitter. PLOS ONE 12(12):1–23.
[Beraldo 2017] Beraldo, D. 2017. Contentious Brand-
ing: Reassembling Social Movements Through Digital Me-
diators. Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Amsterdam.
Available at https://dare.uva.nl/search?identifier=a293284c-
257a-43d2-a26d-e5cb3eaa4e8d.
[Borgatti 2005] Borgatti, S. 2005. Centrality and network
flow. Social Networks 27:55–71.
[Cadwalladr and Graham-Harrison 2018] Cadwalladr, C.,
and Graham-Harrison, E. 2018. Revealed: 50 million
Facebook profiles harvested for Cambridge Analytica in
major data breach. The Guardian. Available at https:
//www.theguardian.com/news/2018/mar/17/cambridge-
analytica-facebook-influence-us-election.
[Courage 2020] Courage. 2020. Free Snowden. https:
//edwardsnowden.com/. Accessed: 27-03-2020.
[Goode 2015] Goode, L. 2015. Anonymous and the political
ethos of hacktivism. Popular Communication 13(1):74–86.
[Greenberg 2016] Greenberg, A. 2016. Wikileak’s dumps
‘Erdogan emails’ after Turkey’s failed coup. Wired. Avail-
able at https://www.wired.com/2016/07/wikileaks-dumps-
erdogan-emails-turkeys-failed-coup/.
[Hagberg, Schult, and Swart 2008] Hagberg, A. A.; Schult,
D. A.; and Swart, P. J. 2008. Exploring network structure,
dynamics, and function using NetworkX. In Proceedings of
the 7th Python in Science Conference (SciPy ’08), 11–15.
[Hutto and Gilbert 2014] Hutto, C. J., and Gilbert, E. E.
2014. VADER: A parsimonious rule-based model for sen-
timent analysis of social media text. In Proceedings of
8th International Conference on Weblogs and Social Media
(ICWSM ’14), 216–225.
[Javers 2012] Javers, E. 2012. Stratfor’s hacked emails ex-
pose some very tangled intelligence gathering. Business
Insider. Available at https://www.businessinsider.com/bi-
stratfor-wikileaks-hacked-emails-2012-2.
[Kigerl 2018] Kigerl, A. 2018. Profiling cybercriminals:
Topic model clustering of carding forum member comment
histories. Social Science Computer Review 36(5):591–609.
[Mack 2019] Mack, Z. 2019. Net neutrality was repealed
a year ago - what’s happened since? The Verge. Avail-
able at https://www.theverge.com/2019/7/9/20687903/net-
neutrality-was-repealed-a-year-ago-whats-happened-since.
[McGovern and Fortin 2020] McGovern, V., and Fortin, F.
2020. The Anonymous collective: Operations and gender
differences. Women and Criminal Justice 30(2):91–105.
[Nouh and Nurse 2015] Nouh, M., and Nurse, J. R. C. 2015.
Identifying key-players in online activist groups on the Face-
book social network. In Proceedings of 2015 IEEE Interna-
tional Conference on Data Mining Workshop (ICDMW ’15),
969–978.
[Nurse and Bada 2018] Nurse, J. R. C., and Bada, M. 2018.
The group element of cybercrime: Types, dynamics, and
criminal operations. In The Oxford Handbook of Cyberpsy-
chology. Oxford University Press. 691–716.
[Olson 2013] Olson, P. 2013. We Are Anonymous. William
Heinemann.
[Pedregosa et al. 2011] Pedregosa, F.; Varoquaux, G.; Gram-
fort, A.; Michel, V.; Thirion, B.; Grisel, O.; Blondel, M.;
Prettenhofer, P.; Weiss, R.; Dubourg, V.; Vanderplas, J.; Pas-
sos, A.; Cournapeau, D.; Brucher, M.; Perrot, M.; and Duch-
esnay, E. 2011. Scikit-learn: Machine learning in Python.
Journal of Machine Learning Research 12:2825–2830.
[Rˇehu˚rˇek and Sojka 2010] Rˇehu˚rˇek, R., and Sojka, P. 2010.
Software framework for topic modelling with large corpora.
In Proceedings of the LREC 2010 Workshop on New Chal-
lenges for NLP Frameworks, 45–50.
[Reynolds 2019] Reynolds, M. 2019. What is Article
13? the EU’s divisive new copyright plan explained.
Wired. Available at https://www.wired.co.uk/article/what-
is-article-13-article-11-european-directive-on-copyright-
explained-meme-ban.
[Ro¨der, Both, and Hinneburg 2015] Ro¨der, M.; Both, A.; and
Hinneburg, A. 2015. Exploring the space of topic coher-
ence measures. In Proceedings of the 8th ACM International
Conference on Web Search and Data Mining (WSDM ’15),
399–408.
[Solon 2012] Solon, O. 2012. What is Acta and why should
you be worried about it? Wired. Available at https://www.
wired.co.uk/article/acta-101.
[Tavabi et al. 2019] Tavabi, N.; Bartley, N.; Abeliuk, A.;
Soni, S.; Ferrara, E.; and Lerman, K. 2019. Characterizing
activity on the deep and dark web. In Companion Proceed-
ings of The 2019 World Wide Web Conference, 206213.
[Tremayne 2014] Tremayne, M. 2014. Anatomy of protest
in the digital era: A network analysis of Twitter and Occupy
Wall Street. Social Movement Studies 13(1):110–126.
[Twitter 2020a] Twitter. 2020a. Twitter developer
policy. https://developer.twitter.com/en/developer-terms/
policy#c-respect-users-control-and-privacy. Accessed: 27-
03-2020.
[Twitter 2020b] Twitter. 2020b. Twitter premium search
api. https://developer.twitter.com/en/docs/tweets/search/
api-reference/premium-search. Accessed: 27-03-2020.
[Uitermark 2017] Uitermark, J. 2017. Complex contention:
analyzing power dynamics within Anonymous. Social
Movement Studies 16(4):403–417.
[Wolfe 2018] Wolfe, L. 2018. Twitter user statistics
2008 through 2017. The Balance Careers. Available at
https://www.thebalancecareers.com/twitter-statistics-2008-
2009-2010-2011-3515899.
